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ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before the Court is whether, in light of several relevailt factors, Ring v. Arizona
536 U.S. 584 (2002), should be applied retroactively. The answer to this question must take into
account the law of retroactivity in Idaho, what test the Court uses to determine whether a new
rule should he retroactively applied, and what outcome application of that test would have when
applied to Ring. In light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1041-42 (2008), this Court
should explore whether Idaho's long established three factor retroactivity test (the "Linklettev
test"') should be employed to determine whether Riizg should be applied to collateral review
cases or, alternatively, whether there is sufficient cause to override stare decisis by rejecting the
Linkletter test in favor of that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
By contrast, the State explicitly seeks to rephrase the issue, transforming it into whether
this appeal must be dismissed ibr lack ofjurisdiction, then spends well over half its arguinent lo
trying to persuade the Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Brief Of Respondent
("Respondent's Brief') at 6,7-23. The State's asserted proper standard of review-"'this Court
should. . .directly address the motion, detemline whether or not the requirements of section 192719 have been met, and rule accordingly""-reflects the State's effort to refocus the Court from
whether Ring should he applied retroactively to whether this case should he dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. The State characterizes the issue and standard of review exclusively in terms of

'Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,622-23 (1965)
'Respondent's Brief at 8 (quoting Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 5 1, 55, 156 P.3d 552
(2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573,575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded on othev
grounds Hairston v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008))

Idaho Code Section 19-2719, notwithstanding Petitioner's state and federal constitutionally
based arguments regarding retroactivity doctrine, the fundamental right to a j u ~ ytrial, and equal
protection and due process guarantees.
The State's blindered approach to the issue before the Court is reflected throughout its
brief, most notably, perhaps, where it characterizes Petitioner's arguments as an effort "to skirt
[his] conviction[] or death sentence[] based upon a new technicality[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14.
To characterize the fundamental right to a jury trial as a "technicality" trivializes our
constitutional rights into a collection of obstacles without any appreciation for how denying those
rights to criminal defendants threatens not merely criminal defendants but citizens and their
relationship to their government. By serving as "'jurors actual or possible[,]"' ordinary citizens
can prevent the july system's "'arbitra~yuse or abuse."' Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406
(1991) (quoting Balzuc v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)).
The State makes three arguments which this brief addresses. First, the State contends that
Idaho's legislature has removed from its courts the jurisdiction to entertain any successive postconvictio~lclaims which are based on the retroactive application of new rules of law.
Respondent's Brief at 7-23. For this reason, the State asserts, the Court has properly never
reached the question of what test should be used to determine what retroactive application a new
mle of law should be given, if any, in a successive capital post-conviction case. Second,
contendiilg that the three-factor Linkletteu retroactivity test is difficult to apply and causes
inconsistent results, the State argues that the Court should adopt the federal retroactivity test (the

"Teague test") which the federal courts developed to address concerns not present in state court
systems-the need for comity and respect for finality of state court convictions in our federalist

system. Respondent's Brief at 24-27. Third, the State asserts that Ring is not retroactively
applicable under the Linkletter test. Id. at 28-31. Fourth, the State contends that fundamental
fairness does not mandate the retroactive application of Ring. Id. at 3 1-33
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER IDAHO'S RETROACTIVITY TEST, RING SHOULD BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT IN THIS CASE.
The State contends that this Court has implicitly rejected the Linkletter test in favor of

what it calls the "GrifSitlz test," under which new decisional rules of law apply only to those
cases not final at the time the new case is decided. Respondent's Brief at 15. However, the State
argues, alternatively, that under the quasi-Grifjith test3, Ring should not be applied retroactively
to cases on collateral review
A.

Liizkletter Is Idaho's Long-Established Retroactivity Test For Determining
Whether A New Decisiolial Rule Should Be Applied To Cases On Collateral
Review.

When this Court first addressed the question of retroactivity, it adopted the three factor
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho
19,25, 523 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1974). There, the Court held:
Three different approaches to retroactivity can be identified. The first approach is
the traditioi~alrule . . . [and under it] a decision [is] applicable to both past and
future cases. [Under] [tlhe second approach[, the prospective rule approach,] . . . a

'The term "quasi-GrifJith" is used deliberately. The Court has stated that the United
States Supreme Court developed the latter test in G r f j t h v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419,825 P.2d 1073,1075, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1992). While
GvifJithheld that new rules applied to all non-final cases, it did not address the applicability of
new rules in collateral review cases. Thus, Griffith did not support the Fetterly holding
prohibiting the retroactive application of new rules to collateral review cases.

decision is effective only in future actions, and does not affect the rule of law in
the case in which the new rule is announced. Under the [third approach, the]
modified prospective rule, the new decision applies prospectively and to the
parties bringing the action resulting in the new decision; or, to the parties bringing
the action and all similar pending actions.
To aid the courts in determining which rule to apply, Linlcletter v. Wallcer set forth
the following factors to be considered. First, the purpose of the new decision must
be analyzed in connection with the question of retroactivity. . . . The second factor
is reliance on the prior rule of law. . . . The third factor is the effect on the
administration ofjustice. This factor takes into account the number of cases that
would be reopened if the decision . . . is applied retroactively.
Thompson. See also Sims v. State, 94 Idaho 801,498 P.2d 1274 (1972) ("In Linlcletter v. Wallcer,

the Supreme Court of the United States said regarding prospective ove~~ulings:
'Tht~s,the
accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the court may in the interest of justice ~naltethe
rule prospective.'") (quoting Linkletter at 628).
The State does not contest that the Court adopted the Linkletter test, nor does it dispute
the Court's continued use of that test. Instead, in the course of asserting that Idaho Code Section
19-2719(5)4 precludes the courts fr01-n entertaining on their merits successive capital postconviction claims which rely on the retroactive application of new rules, the State appears to
argue that the Court carved out capital post-conviction cases as an exception to that test's
universal applicability. Respondent's Brief at 14-18
For stare decisis purposes, what matters is the retroactivity analysis which the Court has
in fact employed. Fetterly and the remaining cases the State cites unquestionably departed from
the Court's earlier consistent application of the Linkletter test. However, the Court decisions in

4Througl~outthis brief, references to Section 19-2719(5) are to the initial paragraph of
that statute section as opposed to its subsections (5)(a), (b), or (c). References to those particular
subsections are specific, e.g., Section 19-2719(5)(c).
4

which the Linklettev test is e~nployedto determine the retroactive effect of new rules booltend
Fettevly and the other cases on which the State relies. Further, as of the 1990, the Court had been

relying on the Linkletter test since 1974.
The State contends that in Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073, velz 'g denied
(1992), the Court utilized a quasi-Griffith bright line of finality test to deny relief. It is true that
Justice Bistline dissented from the majority on, among other things, its retroactivity analysis. He
wrote:
There are three problems with this analysis: I) G r f i t h does not stand for the
proposition stated by the majority, 2) this Court has never adopted Griffith as the
law, nor is it required to fully adopt that case, and 3) under Idaho's cull-ent
retroactivity doctrine, Chavboneau is fully retroactive.
Fettevly, 121 Idaho at 420, 825 P.2d at 1076 (Bistline J., dissenting). The State contends that

"the majority rejected Justice Bistline's position when it relied upon I.C. $19-2719(5) and
Griffith, concluding, 'the Chavboneau interpretation of I.C. 519-2515 does not apply to the

present case because the present case was final prior to the issuance of Charboneau."'
Respondent's Brief at 16. The State's assertion that the majority "rejected Justice Bistline's
position" in his dissenting opinion is sheer speculation grounded in its wrongly equating the
majority's silence regarding Justice Bistline's position with its rejection of that position. The
structure of the State's argume~lt-thatthis Court's overruling the application of the long
established Linkletter test to determine the retroactive effect of a new ~ u l eis revealed by a
comparison between the majority opinion and Justice Bistline's dissent-makes little sense, and
other courts have rejected this argument as unsound. One possible reason why the majority may
not have rejected Justice Bistline's position is that the parties may not have raised the issue.

Another is that the parties may have raise the issue only as a matter of federal and not state law.
Tn any event, silence callnot properly be equated with rejection. United States v. Sterling, 283
F.3d 216,219 (4"' Cir. 2002) ("overruling by implication is not favored"); see also In re
Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4thCir. 1999) ("arguing that a precedent has been ovenxled

through a court's silence is a disfavored enterprise").
Beyond the structure of the State's argument, its substance is counter to this Court's
holdings on stare decisis. This Court consistently holds that "'a question once deliberately
exanlined and decided should be considered settled."' Ultrawell, Iizc. v. Washington Mut. Ba~zk,
FSB, 135 Idaho 832,835,25 P.3d 855,858 (2001) (quoting Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329,335,

158 P.2d 804, 807 (1945). Thus, if the Fetterly majority believed it was shifting course from the
settled law that the retroactivity of a new rule of law was to be determined by application of the
Linlcletter test, it would have provided additional deliberate examination and a reasoned decision.

The absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho
retroactivity test.
Further, while there can be no question that the Fetterly retroactivity analysis is
incoilsisteilt with the Linkletter test employed from the 1970s until that point (and after that point
as well, both in the 1990s and later), the Court's intention is unclear. Whatever the court's
intention at the time, however, it is now clear that Fetterly's use of the bright line of finality test
was an anomaly limited to the 1990s. See infra at 9-1 1.

In addition to Fetterly, the Slate cites four other cases as support for its position that the
Court has excepted successive post-conviction cases from the Linkletter test. Respondent's Brief
at 16-17. Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996); Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899,

935 P.2d 162 (1997); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 P.2d 1081, reh 'g denied (1992); State 1).
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991). As with Fetterly, none of these four additional
cases supports the State's contention.
In only two of the State's five cases, Fetterly and Butler, did the Court plainly state that it
was applying the quasi-Grlffith bright line of finality

Fetterly has been discussed above

Stuart, the only language relevant to the issue is dicta, and even it fails to support the
State's position. Stuart was an appeal born the denial of Mr. Stuart's motion pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Criminal Procedure 60(b)(5). The Court affirmed that denial on the basis of substantive
law, not on the basis of Section 19-2719(5) analysis. Stuart at 437-38, 934-35. In the relevant
dicta, the Court noted that even if the substantive law had favored Mr. Stuart, he still would have
lost because it was announced in a case released after his conviction was final: this "fact. . .would
preclude retroactive application. See Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-19, 825 P.2d 1073,
1074-75 (1991), cert. den. 506 U.S. 1002 (1992) (holding new decision on death penalty
sentencing did not apply retroactively to already final cases)." Stuart at 438, 935. The Court
supplied no reasons for why it would have departed from the quasi-Griffith test. As in Fetterly,
the absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho
retroactivity test.
Card was a unified direct and initial post-conviction appeal case. Here, as with Fetterly,
the State claims that the Court "implicitly rejected" the Linlcletter test. And, again as with
Fetterly, it reaches its conclusion by equating the majority's silence regarding the Linklettev test
with its rejecting that test. As the State notes, Justice Bistline advocated, in his dissent, for the
application of the Linkletter test while the majority applied the new rule "without any reference
to the three-prong Linkletter test." Respondent's Brief at 17. In fact, the majority applied the
quasi-Grfjth rule without any reference to any retroactivity test or any discussion of the
retroactive application of the new rule. Thus, just as in Fetterly, the majority opinion ignores
Justice Bistline's argument. This lack of discussion does not mean that the Court was rejecting
Justice Bistline's argument. The majority might have been in agreement with Justice Bistlille
that the Linkletter test he employed to determine the retroactive applicability of the new rule; if it
did so, it may simply have reached different conclusions regarding the weight of each of the three
factors and, therefore, the outcome of the test's application. Indeed, Justice Bistline
acknowledged this by noting only that "the majority seems to assume that Payne applies here,
such is not necessarily the case." Card at 461, 1117 (italics added). In any event, the absence of
reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho retroactivity test.
Finally, the State argues that by not adopting the position of the dissent on retroactivity,
the majority rejected it in State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991). For the same
reason that this argument fails wit11 regard to the holdings in Fetterly and Caud, it fails here.
And, again, the Court's providing no reasons for departing from the quasi-Grfjth test strongly
suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho retroactivity test.

See supra at 5-7. Butler, a non-capital case, applies the quasi-Grffith test without providing
reasons for the departure from the Linlclettev test. "The Fettevly Court held that while this Court
applied Charboneau to cases that were still open for sentenciilg on the date Charboneau was
released, the defendant's case in Fettevly was finally decided. . . .The remittitur in Butler's direct
appeal was issued on November 12, 1992. . . . On December 28, 1993, this court decided
Townsend. . . . Townsend does not apply to Butler's case." Butlev, 129 Idaho at 901-02,935 P.2d
at 164-5. As in Fettevly, the absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend
to alter the Idaho retroactivity test. Similar language may also be found in a 1993 case from this
Court, State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790,795,852 P.2d 1387, 1392 (1993) ("We hold that the
Guzman decision will be applied retroactively to all cases that had not become final when
Guzman was issued, including those that were in progress in the trial courts. See Grfjth v.
Keiztucly, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073
(1991)."). C j State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 531, 861 P.2d 95, 101 (Ct.App. 1993)
(recognizing that in Josephson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Guzman's "rejection of the
'good faith' exception is retroactively applicable to all cases that had not become final when
Guzman was issued, including those that were in progress in the trial courts.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
While Linkletter was applied in none of the State's five cases, the Court engaged in no
retroactivity ai~alysisshedding light on its apparent departure. Importantly, these cases provide
only an incomplete picture of the Court's retroactivity rulings from the 1990s. In 1993, the same
year that it decided Josephson, the Court decided the retroactive effect of a new decision without
referring, expressly or otherwise, to the quasi-Gviffithbright line of finality rule. State v. Dopp,

124 Idaho 481,861 P.2d 51 (1993). At issue was what showing a defendant must make to be
entitled to withdraw a guilty plea. The Dopp court overruled its earlier holding in State v.
Jackron, 96 Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975), finding that "withdrawal [of an Alford plea] is not

an automatic right and more substantial reasons than just asserting legal innocence must be
given." Id. at 486, 56. The Court then limited its new mle to all guilty pleas entered afier tile
Dopp decision date. Id. This iinmitatioll plainly excludes from the retroactive application of Dopp

some of those whose convictions were not final at the time of that decision, specifically anyone
who entered a guilty plea before the Dopp decision date but whose case remained in trial court
(e.g., because a sentence had not yet been imposed). It is plain from the reasoning in Dopp as
well that the Court did not ernploy the bright line of finality test.
Fetterly, Stuart, Butler, and .Josephsorz are examples of this Court's temporary

determination that the distinction of import ibr questions of retroactivity is between those cases
in which direct appeal was complete, and those in which it was not, at the time the new case was
decided. The Court draws this same distinction in another direct appeal case cited by the State,
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991), as support for the proposition that Justice

Bistline's criticism there of the majority's failure to address the Linkletter test and the cases he
cites somehow demonstrates that "[ilt is clear that Griffith changed Idaho's retroactive test in
criminal cases and LC. g19-2719 changed the mle in capital cases." Respondent's Brief at 18.
This Court has never held, stated in dicta, or merely alluded to a distinction between initial
petition and successive petition post-conviction cases for retroactivity analysis purposes. The
distinction the State draws between initial and successive post-conviction petitions is a
distinction without a difference for Idaho retroactivity analysis purposes.

Further, the Court had been relying on the Linkletter test since 1974. Thompson v
Hagan. And it employed that test in all manner of cases (civil and criminal, direct appeal and
post-conviction) throughout the 1970s, the 1980s, and into the 1990s. See, e.g., .Jones v. Watson,
98 Idaho 606, 608, 570 P.2d 284, 286 (1977) (creditor lawsuit); State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670,
587 P.2d 305 (1978) (first degree burglary convictions);State v. Machevi, 100 Idaho 167, 595
P.2d 316 (1979) (escape conviction); Gay v. County Commissioners of Bo~tnevilleCounty, 103
Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.1982) (zoning case); State v. Tisdale, 103 Idaho 836,654 P.2d
1389 (Ct.App. 1982) (citing to Gay as authority for three-factor Linkletter test); Robertson v
Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 21 1 (1990) (tort action); Baizer
v. Shavers, III.c.,117 Idaho 696,791 P.2d 1275 (1990); Potlatch Corp. v. Idaho State Tux Coin'iz,
120 Idaho 1, 813 P.2d 340 (1991) (tax case); and V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petvoleurn clean Water
Trust Fund, 128 Idaho 890, 894-95,920 P.2d 909,913-14 (1996) (transfer reeltax case)
Recently, in describing Idaho's current retroactivity law, the Court reached back to three
of its seminal retroactivity decisions from the 1970s, Thompson, Tipton, and Watson, as support
for its holding:
The usual rule is that decisions of this Court apply retroactively to all past and
pending cases. State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670,587 P.2d 305 (1978). For policy
reasons, however, this Court has discretion to limit the retroactive application of a
particular decision. . . .When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application
of a decision we weigh three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the
reliance upon the prior law; and (3) the effect upon the administration ofjustice if
the decision is applied retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d
1365 (1974). We balance the first factor against the other two to determine
whether to limit the retroactive application of the decision. Jones v. Watson.,98
Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977).

BHA Investnzents, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315, 320 (2004). The
Court has very recently cited in a cril~lillalcase to Tipton as support for the proposition that a
judicial rule may be given only prospective effect if it overrules precedent on which the parties
inay have justifiably relied. State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 181 P.3d 440 (2008).6 Plainly, if the
quasi-Grfjtlz rule was ever live Idaho doctrine, it is no longer.
Even if it would make sense (which it would not) to read the proposition for which Tipton
is cited as invoking the Fetterly bright line of finality test, citing to Tzpton rather than Fetterly or
one of the other cases from the 1990s employing the Fetterly test is inconsistent with such a
reading. While standing alone, then, Adair may not be a clear invocation or application of the
Linkletter test, it and the Fetterly bright line of finality test clearly are mutually exclusive. When
read in the context of BHA Investments, Inc., Adair reflects the Court's adoption of the Lznkletter
test for determining the retroactive effect of a new decision which breaks wit11 precedent.
Thus, whatever the Court's intent in the 1990s, Linkletter plainly remains Idaho's
retroactivity test.

B.

Under Linkletter, Ring Should Be Applied To Idaho Cases
On Collateral Review.

On the State's view, even under Linkletter, Ring is not retroactively applicable on
collateral review. Respondent's Brief at 28-31. This is because, the State continues, the United
States Supreme Court has already decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not
retroactively applicable. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), and Duncan v. Louisiana,

'While the State asserts that Adair is irrelevant to Linkletter's applicability, Respondent's
Brief at 17 n.7, Adair's consideration of a criminal case in terms of Linkletter's retroactivity
analytical organization is clearly significant.

391 U.S. 145 (1968). The State contends that "[tlhere is simply no basis for distinguishing . . .

DeStefano[.]" Respondent's Brief at 3 1. In fact, there are three deep, obvious, and relevant
divides between DeStefano and the instant case
First, the question in DeStefano was whether tlie Sixth Amendme~itright to jury guilt
phase trial was retroactively applicable, whereas the question before this Court is much more
limited. Here, llowever, the question not only concerns just the sentencing phase but, 111ore
narrowly still, tlie initial question in that proceeding: whether a capital defendant is eligible for
the death penalty.7 The practical difference between the questions posed by Danfovth and this
case is seen in how the third of tlie three factors is framed. The DeStefano court found that
the effect of a holding of general retroactivity on law enforce~iientand the
administration of justice would be significant, because the denial ofjury trial has
occurred in a very great number of cases in those States not until now according
the Sixth Amendment guarantee. For exa~nple,in Louisiana all those co~ivictedof
noncapital serious crimes could make a Sixth Amendment argument. And,
depending on tlie Court's decisions about unanimous and 12-man juries, all
convictions for serious crimes in certain other States would be in jeopardy.

Id. at 634. The case at bar, by contrast, implicates an extremely limited number of cases. Only
capital cases would be affected by a finding that the right to a jury determination of death penalty
eligibility is retroactive. Of the capital cases in Idaho, eleven or, at most, twelve cases would be
affected. Opening Brief at 21 n.6. While this is a co~npellingdifference, there is another,
perhaps more compelling, one. The DeStefano court was partly driven by a perceived twin risk
of gargantuan proportion to the adini~iistrationof justice: not merely the prospect "in Louisiana
7The Court has vely recentIy noted that the holding in Ring is limited to this question.
State v. Payne, slip op. at *27,2008 WL 5205959 (Idaho 12115108) ("Although unnecessary
under Ring v. Arizona, it is very plain the Idaho Legislature meant that in all capital cases after
the enactme~itof the 2003 arnendme~itsjuries were to conduct the analysis the judge had
previously conducted under the old LC. § 19-2515.").

[ofl all those convicted of noncapital serious crimes. . .making a Sixth Amendment argument
[and, therefore, at risk of being released, but also by the prospect ofl all col~victionsfor serious
crimes in certain other States. . .be[ing] in jeopardy." Id. at 634. There is no risk of release in
the instant or any case which could be governed by the Court's holding that Ring retroactively
applies on collateral review. The very worst case scenario from the State's perspective is that of
a resentencing proceeding resulting in a life without parole sentence. Thus, the retroactivity
question presented by the instant case differs dramatically from that decided in DeStefano in
ways which should result, correlatively, in dramatically less weight being accorded the
administrative ofjustice part of the Linkletter test.
Second, the DeStefano court's Sixth Amendment jury trial right analysis was exclusively
in terms of individual defendants' right to trial by jury. Nowhere in the dccisioll is there mention
or consideration of the prospective jurors' stake in that right. Thus, the Court's collclusion that
"[tlhe value implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring
retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial" is in no way an assessment of whether the value to the community
would be served by requiring retrial of persons convicted of the gravest offense and sentenced to
the harshest penalty. Id. at 634. See infra at 15; Opening Brief at 14-17.
Third, contrary to the State's argument, the value judgments made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction, in this instance the United States Supreme Court, neither prevent nor
absolve this Court from making its own deliberate assessments of each of the tlwee factors. This
is not only because, as outlined in the last two paragraphs, the question at issue in this case is
different from that presented in DeStefano, but also because it is the essence of the holding in

Danforth. See, e.g., id. at 1041 (the Teague test "was tailored to the unique context of federal
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own
postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion"). It is also because the facts which
inform the assessment may differ between jurisdictions.' Historically, different states have made
different assessments in applying those factors to determine the retroactive effect of a new mle.
In fact, other courts of coordinate jurisdiction have employed the Linlcletter test to reach
conflicting conclusions on whether Ring may be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review. Cornpave, ee.g.,Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400,412 (Fla. 2005) (applying three factor
test, concludes Ring is not retroactive on collateral review) and State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d
253 (Mo. 2003) (applying three factor test, concludes Ring is retroactive 011 collateral review).
There is no reason to assume that this Court will or should make the same assessments and reach
the same conclusioi~sas the United States Supreme Court or any other court of coordinate
jurisdiction. Cf: State v. Newrnaiz, 108 Idaho 5, 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 862 n.6 (1985) ("Long gone
are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and
methodology when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions.").
DeStefano does not control. Independent application of the Linkletter test demonstrates
that Ring should be applied to collateral review cases.
The dual purposes of the fundamental right to jury trial guaranteed state defendants by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is to protect individual defendants and to ensure community
participation in serious trials, thereby ensuring that cominunity values are reflected in the
'Of course, the relevant facts may change over time within a single jurisdiction. Thus,
with regard to some new rules, it may be that a change in relevant facts would lead a court to
change its assessment.

sentence imposed. Applying Ring to collateral review cases would further these purposes,
whereas failure to do so would thwart them. Failure to apply Ring retroactively in collateral
review cases would thwart its dual purposes. Having been denied his fundamental right to a juiy
detennination of eligibility for a death sentence, Mr. Fields would be executed pursuant to a
sentence which cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. At the same time, the coinmunity
would be denied participation in a critical part of the most serious kind of criminal trial, the
sentencing proceeding of a capital trial.
As for the reliance on the prior state of the law, the State has no interest in executing
uizconstitutionally imposed sentences. The State does not dispute that the federal constitutional

issue ofjury participation in capital sentencing proceedings was hotly disputed, at least until the
United States Supreme Court temporarily and mistakenly "settled" the question in Waltoiz v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). While Fields was sentenced post-Walton, the State's reliance on

an erroneous Supreme Court decision should carry relatively little weight given the few cases
affected and the fundamental right that was violated.
Additionally, because applying Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review would
affect only a small number of cases, the weight accorded the reliance factor should be small.
Gaf-fodv. State, 127 Idaho 472,475,903 P.2d 61,64, reh 'g denied (1995) (on case before

Court, retroactive effect to cases already final found to be "of limited applicability and will affect
only those criminal defendants currently [committed] in Idaho under the prior statutory scheme").
Finally, applying Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review will have a substantial
positive but minimal, if any, negative impact on the administration ofjustice. The number of
cases which could be affected is known: ten, or depending on the outcome of the federal district

court's order granting sentencing relief in one case, possibly eleven. See Opening Brief at 21 n.6.
This Court has previously allowed retroactive application where it would add a relatively small
number of cases to the district courts' dockets. See, e.g., Bergman v. Ifenvy, 115 Idaho 259, 263,
766 P.2d 729,733 (1988) (retroactively applying a new rule finding that cause of actioil lies
against a licensed vendor of intoxicating beverages for the wrongful death of and personal
injuries to third parties caused by the continued serving of alcohol to the patron of the bar).
Based on the small number of cases at stake here, the administration ofjustice factor weighs
strongly in favor of retroactively applyingRing. Finally, administration of justice must also be
measured by the degree to which the public's respect for judicial decisions through justice and
equitable outcomes will likely continue. The jury injects a democratic element into the law.
This element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding
the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the law and the necessaly
general acquiescence in their application. Green v. US., 356 U.S. 165, 215-16 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (citations, internal quotation marks, and
footnotes omitted). Far from maintaining the public's continuing respect for the judiciary,
treating similarly situated individuals dissiinilarly based on fortuity creates a lack of trust -which
is, of course, precisely the reason why the Constitution and Bill of Rights guarantee jury trials.
Retroactively applying Ring will further its purpose, whereas not retroactively apply it
would thwart its purpose. There was no legitimate reliance in pre-Wnlton cases on the refusal to
involve juries in sentencing proceedings. Applying Ring retroactively will have a net substantial
positive effect on the administration ofjustice. Under Linlclettev, Ring must be retroactively
applied to cases on collateral review.

The Court also has the authority to prevent the need for resentencing proceedings in those
few cases by reducing the sentence at issue to the maximum legal term. State v. Lindquist, 99
Idaho 766,589 P.2d 101 (1979) (when defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, he was
necessarily found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder; accordingly,
despite the fact that defendant could not be sentenced under the' uilconstitutional death penalty
statute then in effect or under the unconstitutional pre-amendment version, it was appropriate to
remand the cause to district court for resentenciilg to any punishment permitted for conviction of
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder); State v; Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d
114 (Idaho1979) (remanded for resentencing consistent with State v. Lindquist); see also, State v.
Mouuis, 131 Idaho 263, 267, 954 P.2d 681, 685 (1998) (district court's Rule 35 motion denial
reversed, and appellant's sentence modified to bring it within legal limits)
11.

THE TEAGUE RETROACTIVITY TEST, TAILORED TO THE FEDERAL
COURTS' OBLIGATION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE NATION'S
FEDERALIST SYSTEM, SHOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE LONG
ESTABLISHED IDAHO TEST FOR DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVE
EFFECT OF NEW DECISIONAL LAW.
Teague was fashioned to reflect and promote our Nation's federalist system, specifically

the role federal courts play in relation to state courts. As the United States Supreme Court has
recently noted, Teague speaks to the need for comity and respect for finality of state court
convictions in o w federalist system. "If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of
allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a bvoader class of individuals than is required by
Teague. And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal
habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States

are Bee to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are
seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts." Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at
1041 (emphasis added).
The State contends that if theCou~trejects its argument that Idaho Code Section 192719(5) prohibits the courts from entertaining any successive capital post-conviction claim based
on the retroactive application of new law, then it should adopt the Teague standard for
determining a new decision's retroactive effect. Respondent's Brief at 24-27. For the reasons set
forth here and in the Opening Brief, the Court should decline the State's invitation and adhere to
the Linkletter test.
Tile arguments in favor of adopting the Teague test, the State claims, are that it will (1)
"provide unifomity in Idaho's application of new rules of criminal law[,]" (2) "eliminate a
confusing and unbridled standard that was abandoned years ago by the [United States] Supreme
Court and a majority of states[,]" and (3) preserve finality ofjudgments, without which "'the
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect."' Id. at 27 (quoting Flamer v. State, 585
A.2d 736, 749 (Del. 1990)). The State also notes that the United States Supreme Court has
criticized the Linkletter standard as "'unprincipled and inequitable."' Respondent's Brief at 24
(quoting Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. at 1037). The State notes, as well, that the Supreme
Court criticized the Linlcletter standard as leading "'to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of
siinilarly situated defendants on collateral review"' due to its '"failure to treat retfoactivity as a
threshold question and [its] inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review."'
Respondent's Brief at 25. These three argumeilts are addressed below in serial order.

A.

Far From Creating Uniformity In Idaho's Application Of New Rules Of
Crimi~lalLaw, The Tcague Standard Has Created Illegitimate And Massive
Disparities In The Application Of Those New Rules.

As noted just above, the State recites the United States Supreme Court's criticislns of the
Linkletter test. Those criticisms were lodged by the Teague court. It should come as no surprise,
then, that the criticisins assume a pre-ordained divide between cases on direct review and those
on collateral review. One of the criticisins was that the Linlcletter test led to indefensible
disparities in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review. Whatever one
thinks of the direct/collateral review distinction in theory, it is indisputable that in practice
whether a particular case remains in direct appeal proceedings or moves into collateral
proceedings is a matter of how quiclcly (or not) a case is processed by the judicial system. For
this reason, the Teague standard creates unprincipled and inequitable disparities in the treatment
of defendants are identically situated but for fortuitous timing differences.
For these same reasons, Respondent's argument that fundamental fairness is not violated
by a failure to apply Ring retroactively is mis-guided. Lilce the arbitrary application of the death
penalty found uncoiistitutio~~al
in Furrnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (criticizing
"capricously selected random handful" of death sentences as "cruel and unusual in the sanle way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual")(Stewart, J., concurring), the random,
fortuitous grant of a jury trial right to some, but not all capitally sentenced inmates in Idaho is
unprincipled and inequitable.
The instant case illustrates exactly how fortuitous differences can lead to the enforcement
of a fundainental constitutional right in one person's case and the intentional lack of enforcement
of that same fundamental constitulional right in another person's, with the lives of both

individuals hanging in the balance. As noted in the Opening Brief, Mr. Fetterly was charged with
first degree murder in 1983 while Mr. Fields was charged in 1989. After Mr. Fetterly's initial
death sentence was overtunled by the federal courts, he was resentenced to death. His direct
appeal fkom that resentencing was ongoing when Ring was decided. Consequently, in 2002, this
Court ordered that Mr. Fetterly's case be remanded for resentencing proceedings. By contrast,
Mr. Fields, convicted approximately six years after Mr. Fetterly, has been in collateral
proceedings since the early 1990s. He has been denied Ring relief under Teague. Mr. Fetterly
received Ring relief based on the chance event that the federal courts ordered sentencing relief,
not based on anything he did,
B.

Finality's Purpose Of Administrative Efficiency Must Not Trump
Fundamentai Constitutional Rights.

The argument that finality is necessary to prevent the release of large numbers of
convicted criminals or the expenditure of large sums of money necessary for further court
proceedings to avoid their release implies that finality is of no concenl in the Linlcletter test. But
the implication is plainly false. The third factor in the Linklettev test talces finality into account in
considering the administrative burden which would be caused by the retroactive application of
the new rule. Instead, the State's argument seems to be that finality should trump other
legitimate considerations, e.g.- that the violated right is a fundamental constitutional right.
C.

Finality No More Favors Teague Than Linkletter.

The State cites finality as a value which supports the adoptio~lof the Teague test.
Respondent's Brief at 26 (providing as an example of why some other states have adopted
Teague that Illinois did so "focusing up011 the interests of finality"). This wrongly suggests that

the LinWetter test either undervalues or altogether fails to talce finality into account. The weight
a court gives the second and third Linlcletter factors-prior reliar~ceand effect on the
administration ofjustice-is partly a function of the value placed on finality. With Teague, on the
other hand, finality is the only value generally worthy of consideration. Its two exceptions are
just that, exceptions. And the United States Supreme Court has made the extraordinarily limited
scope of the second exception very plain: "This class of rules is extremely narrow, and 'it is
unlikely that any. . . has yet to emerge."'Schviro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)
(quoting Tyler v. Caiiz, 533 U.S. 656,667 n. 7 (2001) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,
243 (1990)) (internal quotation marlcs omitted). If this Court were to replace Linlcletter with
Teague, it would be replacing discretion with rigidity.
Finality was introduced into retroactivity jurisprudence when, in the 1960s, the United
States Supreme Court decided several cases introducing into legal practice a variety
constitutionally guaranteed rules of criminal procedure. At issue in Linkletter, for example, "was
whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which made the exclusionary rule applicable to the
States, should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review." Teague, 489 U.S. at 302.
The test developed in Linklettev and, more specifically, its application in that and similar cases in
the 1960s responded to the fear that Mapp and the related decisions would cause the release of a
large percentage of defendants convicted of serious crimes. But Lznkletter allows for sensible
judgments in different factual contexts. Where the threat of emptying prisolls is not so great or
where, as in the instant case, it is non-existent, courts need not accord as much weight to the
administration ofjustice factor. Teague allows no such flexibility.

Obviously, Teague represents the court's nonnative judgment that finality should trump
most other values. The second exception to the non-retroactivity presumptioil for some
constitutionally mandated rules of criminal procedure incorporates the normative judgment that
when the likelihood of an accurate convictioll is seriously diminished without the new procedural
rule under consideration, finality should be trumped. But Teague nowhere suggests any
appreciation for according some similarly heightened value to those constitutionally mandated
~ u l e sof criminal procedure aimed at not only protecting individual defendants but, by reinforcing
the particular constitutional structure of our government, the citizenry generally. See, e . g ,

Dickerson v. U S . , 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (though the Mirando rule is a prophylactic, it "safeguards
a 'fundamental trial right"') (quoting Wilhrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,691 (1993)). The Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial is a right with just such a dual purpose. See supva at 13-16;
Opening Brief at 14-17. Teague fails to allow courts to account for this duality by failing to
allow them, when detennining whether the right to jury trial applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review, to consider the Idaho citizens' stalce in preserving the structure of their
govemnent-specifically, preserving undiminished the federal right to trial by jury as a check
against potential government abuse. Even if the presumptive non-retroactivity of Teague were
attractive, its exceptions are too narrow. Courts inust not relinquish authority to retroactively
apply newly acknowledged rules of criminal procedure mandated by fundamental constitutional
rights, especially those which serve not merely to protect individual defendants but the
governmental structure of our Nation as well. In addition to the policy reasons for why courts
sliould not do this, the constitutioi~alseparation of powers mandate prohibits their doing it. For
pronouncing that a constitutionally mandated, judicially acknowledged but not legislatively

codified rule is retroactively applicable is an essential function of the courts. Relinquishing it is
to legislate a fundamental change of Idaho's government structure, and doing so would thus
infringe on the legislative ftmction in violation of the constitutionally mandated separation of
powers
Even if the Court were to relinquish that authority generally, there is at least one
constitutional constraint prohibiting total relinquishment. Deploying, especially where nothing
compels it and where the defendant has done nothing to deserve it, a judicially created doctrine to
preclude reaching the merits of a claimed violation of a federal constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental right violates federal co~lstitutionallyguaranteed due process.
D.

There Is No Evidence That The Finality Of Judgments Has A Deterrent
Effect.

The State repeats the fi-equently made assertion that finality has a detenent effect.
However, it does not burden its assertion with factual support. It is, at best, a highly suspect
proposition that most individuals who murder would not -if only they ltnew that constitutional
rights acknowledged after their conviction and sentence were final would not apply to them.
E.

While The Majority Of States Have Adopted Teague, It Is Unclear How
Many Understood That The Federal Constitution Empowered Them To Do
Otherwise.

The State asserts that the majority of states have adopted Teague. While that may be so,
it is also true that, before Danforth, a variety of state high courts mistaltenly believed that they
had no choice, at least with respect to federal constitutional rights. Further, judicial decisionmaking is not a popularity contest. The question should not be whether the majority of courts
rule one way or another, hut whether there is thoughtful dispute between those states which have

adopted different approaches. The fact that there is a sig~lificantsplit suggests that there is
thoughtful dispute. The decisioils reflect this as well. Finally, at least thirteen state high courts
have adopted non-Teague tests for determining the retroactive application of new stale law n~les.
See, e.g., Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 28 (Alas. App. 2006) (Alaska's retroactivity test is
Linkletter); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386,393,64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (applying a hybrid
Teague-Linkletter test for determining whether a ~ u l eis retroactive); People v. Carrera, 49
Cal.3d 291, 3 12-13, 777 P.2d 121, 142-43 (1989) (declining to adopt Teague for state law
retroactivity issues); Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400,409 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting Teague and
applying its own retroactivity test); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 378, 878 P.2d 699, 717
(1994) (reaffining that Linlcletter is retroactivity test. for new state law); Pohutski v. City of
Allen Purl, 465 Mich. 675,641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (court applies Linkletter, explaining that
Teague doesn't apply to new slate law); State v. Whi$eld, 107 S.W.3d 253,267 (Mo. 2003)
(adopting Liizklettev); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 518 (S.D. 1990) (rejecting Teague);
People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645,647-48,717 N.E.2d 684, 686-87 (1999) (applies Linlcletter
for state law retroactivity issues); Page v. Palmateev, 336 Or.379, 382-84, 84 P.3d 133, 136-38
(2004) (not bound by federal retroactivity doctrine when determining retroactive application of
new state law); Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748,755 (Tenn. 1993) (declining to adopt Teague
for state co~~stitutional
laws); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 912 n.9 (Utah
1993) (noting that Court adopted Linkletter in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983));
Farbotnilc v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 601-02 (Wyo. 1993) (reaffirming that Linklettev test still used
post-Teague because allows the court "to weigh the interest of justice").

111.

IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-271 9 ALLOWS SUCCESSIVE
POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS BASED ON THE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF NEW DECISIONAL RULES OF LAW.

The State argues that Idaho's legislature has removed from her courts jurisdiction to
consider successive capital post-conviction claims based on the retroactive applicatioli o f new
rules o f law. Respondent's Brief at 7-23. Even though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)
explicitly prohibits such claims, the Stale expressly eschews that subsection as the basis o f its
argument. hstead, the State opts to base its argument on Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5),which
was enacted before Section 19-2719(5)(c)and which contains no language regarding
argument.
retroactivity. Subsection A addresses the State's jurisdictio~~al
In the course o f making its jurisdictional argument, the State disputes some but not all o f
the arguments Mr. Fields makes in his Opening Brief attacking Section 19-2719(5)and Section
19-2719(5)(c)on state and federal constitutional grounds.

111 particular,

the State argues that

Section 19-2719(5)does not violate either the Idaho Constitution's separation o f powers mandate
or Mr. Fields' state and federal rights to due process aid equal protection. Along the way, the
State argues that the legislature's expression at the tiine o f enacting Section 19-2719(5)that it be
applied retroactively ineans that successive post-conviction claims in capital cases based on the
retroactive application of new mles o f law are prohibited. These arguments are addressed in
serial order below.

A.

Applying Established Rules Of Statutory Analysis Demonstrates That The
Legislature Intended Idaho Code $19-2719(5) To Allow Successive PostConviction Claims Based On The Retroactive Application Of New Rules Of
Law.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) sets out the general rule that capital defendants are
limited to a single post-conviction petition:
Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgiiient imposing the punish~nent
of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must file any legal or
factual challenge to the sentence or convictio~ithat is known or reasonably should
be known.
I.C. 519-2719(3). The State notes that the only exception to this rule is provided for by Section
19-2719(5), and that the Court has suinrnarized the exception to this rule as allowiiig "those
unusual cases where it can be de~nonstratedthat the issues raised were not ltnown and reasonably
could not have been known within the tinie frame allowed by the statute." State v. Rhoatles, 120
Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665,677 (1991); Respondent's Brief at 9. Section 19-2719(5) also
provides, the State iiotes, that "[ijf a capital defendant fails to co~nplywith the specific
requirements of I.C. 519-2719, including the specified time limits, the issues are 'deemed to have
[been] waived' and '[tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for
relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.' LC. $19-2719(5); McKinney [v. State],
133 Idaho [695,] 700[, 992 P.2d 144,1149 [(1999)]." Respondent's Brief at 9. The State claims
that the Idaho Code Sectioii 19-2719(5) exception to the general rule restricting capital
defendants to a single post-conviction petition does not allow claims based on the retroactive
application of new rules of law.

The State argues that because Mr. Fields failed to raise his jury participation in sentencing
proceedings claiin in his initial consolidated appeal," hut that the claim was ltnown at that time,
and therefore, that section 19-2719 precludes its being raised in a successive petition.
Acknowledging that in Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), the Court has allowed a
successive petition on a claim raised in earlier proceedings, the State contends that the new
information there was new evidence whereas here it is merely a new constitutional right
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. While in Sivak, the Court was concerned
that failure to allow the successive claim would block the consideration of aprirna facie actual
innocence claim, the State suggests that no siinilarly compelling concern is at issue here. Instead,
according to the State, all that is at issue is "a new technicality which the original courts never
envisioned[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14.
1.

Applied to Section 19-2719(5), long established rules of statutory
analysis demonstrate that the legislature intended $19-2719(5) to
allow successive capital claims based on retroactive application of new
decisional rules of law.

The meaning of Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) is plain on its face, and it has nothing
whatsoever to say about retroactivity.
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the
time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as
were known, or reasonably should have been ltnown. The courts of Idaho shall
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or
grant any such relief.

'But see Opening Brief at 1-2 (citing this court's prior determination, in response to
argument raised in Fields' brief, rejecting Fields' argument that his sentencing proceeding was
coilstitutionally infirm for lack ofjury determination in the finding of an aggravating
circumstance).

LC. $19-2719(5). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Slate v. McCoy,
128 Idaho 362, 365,913 P.2d 578,581 (1996). Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court
assumes that the legislature meai~twhat is clearly stated in the statute." State v. Rhode, 133
Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). For these reasons, the State's project to read
retroactivity into Section 19-2719(5) trips at the starting gate.
Even if ambiguity is read into Section 19-2719(5), the State's argument utterly fails to
apply long established rules of statutory analysis. Applying these principles reveals that the
legislature intended Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) to allow successive post-conviction claims
resting on the retroactive application of new rules of law. First, the State never addresses how
Section 19-2719 (5) can possibly be squared with the legislature's later amendii-ig subsection
(5)(c) into the statute, expressly prohibiting as facially illsufficient any "successive postconviction pleading. . .to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." I.C.
$19-2719(5)(~)(1995).
This Court has long held that it will not presume that the legislature intends to enact
duplicative statutory provisions and, conelatively, that the particular statutory words being
inspected must be construed in light of the remaining statutory language. For example, the Court
has repeatedly relied on the no duplicative language statutory provisions language in discerning
the meaning of the "utter disregard" aggravating factor in Idaho's capital sentencing scheme. 111

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,436, 825 P.2d 1081, 1092 (1991), the Court traced that history,
noting that it was first called upon to determine the meaning of the "utter disregard" aggravating
factor in State v. Osbovn, 102 Idaho 405,418-19,631 P.2d 187,200-01 (1981). There, to apply

the no duplicative provision presumption, the Court held that it had to compare the "utter
disregard" factor to the other factors to ensure that whatever meaning ascribed to "utter
disregard" was not part of one of the remaining aggravating factors, rendering the factor under
consideration Inere surplusage.
To properly define this circumsta~~ce,
it is important to note the other aggravating
circuinstances with which this provision overlaps. The second aggravating
circumstance, I.C. 519-25 15(f)(2), that the defendant committed another murder at
the time this murder was committed, obviously could show ail utter disregard for
huinan life, as could the third aggravating circumstance, LC. 519-25 15(f)(3), that
the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The same
can be said for the fourth aggravating circumstance, I.C. $19-2515($)(4), that the
murder was committed for remuneration. Since we will not presume that the
legislative intent was to duplicate any already enumerated circumstance, thus
making I.C. ij 19-2515(f)(6) mere surplusage (See, e. g., Norton v. Dept. of
Employment, 94 Idaho 924,500 P.2d 825 (1972)), we hold that the phrase
"utter disregard" must be viewed in reference to acts other than those set
forth in I.C. $5 19-2515(f)(2), (3), and (4). We coilclude instead that the phrase
is meant to be reflective of acts or circu~nstancessurrounding the crime which
exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the
cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.
State v. Carcl, 121 Idaho 425,436, 825 P.2d 1081, 1092 (1991) (quoting State v. Osborn, 102

Idaho 405,418-19,631 P.2d 187,200-01 (1981) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted)).
The Card Court relied on the no duplicative provision presunlption in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho
82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989), to distinguish t l ~ eutter disregard aggravator from the "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravator
[Tlhe "utter disregard" factor refers not lo the outrageousness of the acts
constitutinn- the murder, but to the defendant's lack of conscientious scruoles
against killing another hurnan being.

....
The particularly cold-blooded ltiller need not act sadistically or in a particularly
outrageous fashion in order to commit a killing with utter disregard for human
life. One who commits a crime in an especially heinous way is punished for the
heinousness of his crime, not because he acted with utter disregard for human life,

although it may be expected that most especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
murders will have been committed with utter disregard for human life.
State v. Card, 121 Idaho at 436, 825 P.2d at 1092 (quoting State v. Fain, 116 Idaho at 99, 774
P.2d at 269).1°
The State's contention that the pre-subsection (c) version of Section 19-2719 does not
e
allow post-conviction petition claims which rely on tlle retroactive application of a new n ~ l of
law runs afoul of the no duplicative statutory language principle. The State careftllly notes that it
"is not relying upon I.C. $19-2719(5)(c), but upon LC. $19-2719(5), which does not provide an
exception for the retroactive applicatioii of new rules of law, as established by this Court in
Fetterly." The problem with the State's gloss on Section 19-2719(5) is that it renders into mere
surplusage the legislature's subsequent enactment of Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s prohibition of any
successive post-conviction petition that seeks retroactive application of new rules of law. The
legislature would have had no need to enact Section 19-2719(5)(c) unless Section 19-2719(5)
allowed retroactive application of new rules of law.

''See Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 118 Idaho 422,425,797 P.2d 130, 133 (1990) ("We
do not make mere 'surplusage' of the provisions of the statutes, and that we construe them,
insofal-as possible, to give ~neaningto all of their parts in light of the legislative intent expressed
therein."); Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401,403,757 P.2d 664,666 (1988) ("[Olur prior
cases have held that 8tatutoly or constitutional provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be
interpreted in the context of the entire document. Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474,476, 725 P.2d
179, 181 (1986) ( 'Statutes must be read to give effect to evely word, clause and sentence.');
Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688,690,692 P.2d 332, 334, reh'g denied (1984) ('We will
not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of the provisions included
therein.'); Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 310-1 1, 658 P.2d 978, 981-82,petition
for review denied (Ct. App. 1983) ("The particular words of a statute should be read in context;
and the statute as a whole should be construed, if possible, to give meaning to all its parts in light
of the legislative intent.").

Second, "[ilt is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full
knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state. C. Forsnzan Real Estate
Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 5 11,547 P.2d 1116 (1976); Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass 'n v. Robison, 65
Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944); Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 48 Cal.3d 602, 257 Ca1.Rptr.
320,770 P.2d 732 (1989); Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 678 P.2d 934 (1984)." George W
Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540,797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). Further, "[tlhe
legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an
intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of 110
other reasonable construction." Id.
The Ida110 Code provides that
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
the constitution or law of the United States, in all cases not provided for 111 these
compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
LC. 573-1 16. It is established that, "[alt common law there was no authority for the proposition
that judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blackstone stated the rule that the duty of
the court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expouild the old one.' 1
Blackstone, Coin~nentaries69 (15thed. 1809)." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23
(1965) (footnote omitted). When first enacted, 519-2719 included no language making plain any
legislative intention to overturn the common law rule that new judicial decisions be applied
retroactively. Nor did the statutory language admit of any other reasonable conclusion than that
the legislature intended to overturn that common-law rule. Thus, the State's argun~entthat $1 92719(5) does not allow successive post-conviction claims which rely on the retroactive
application of new rules of decisional law fails.

2.

Elevating judicial efficiency over the retroactive application of Ring
would eIevate judicial efficie~~cy
over justice, which Sivak prohibits.

Additionally, this Court has unambiguously held that successive post-conviction petitions
litigating old claims 011 the basis of new information are permissible: "Applymg this rule as the
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence
in successive post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been
suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct. We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that
will work ii~justicein the name ofjudicial efficiency." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636
(2000). Cf: Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,231,392 P.2d 279,281 (1964) ("111 the instant case

... if we deny petitioner's application he will be in the unfortunate and medieval position of
possessing a right for which there exists no remedy."). Ring was decided only shortly before Mr.
Fields filed his successive petition. As the Court is aware, Ring overruled Walton v. Arizoiza,
497 U.S. 639 (1990), which bad held that Arizona's sentencing scheme under which the
sentencing judge determined the existence of death qualifying aggravating factor(s) was
compatible with the Sixth Amendnlent. Since Petitioner's claims were based on information
which could not reasoilably have been known at an earlier time since it did not exist at an earlier
time, they met the Section 19-2719(5) exception. The State reads Sivak too narrowly, contending
that the holding extends only to new evidence, as opposed to new law, because the Court's
rationale was limited to actual innocence. Yet there is precious little in Sivak to support the
State's view that this Court is willing to elevate judicial efficiency over justice in all cases except
those where actual innocence is at issue. Mr. Fields was sentenced in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to jury trial." Elevating judicial efficiency over the enforcement of a
constitutional right adopted to protect the colnmunity as well as individual defendants from
governmental abuse by guaranteeing juiy service to ordinary citizens would elevate efficiency
over justice every bit as much as does elevating efficiency over the coi~siderationof new
evidence of actual innocence. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406 (1991) (quoting Balzac v.

Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)).
The State completely ignores the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee's critical
commuility protection purpose, in favor of exclusively characterizing the guarantee as "merely
a mechanism" and "a new technicality[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14. This mischaracterizatio~~
by
omission trivializes our constitutional rights into a collection of obstacles which should be
extended to everyone other than criminal defendants -on the presumption that none of "us" will
ever be "them."
Perhaps recognizing that its reading of Section 19-2719 ignores established rules of
statutory analysis and that its reading oESivak is unprincipled, the State asserts that, in Hogman

v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 30, 121 P.3d 958, 961 (2005), the Court held that jury participation in
sentencing claims earlier litigated may not be litigated in successive post-conviction proceedings.
Here is the suin total of the H o f f a n Court's Section 19-2719 analysis:
"The State erroneously insists that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of
death sentence eligibility is a new right. See Danfovth at 1035 & 1047 (every individual
sentenced to death where a jury did not make the eligibility finding was sentenced illegally,
regardless of whether they were sentenced before or after Ring was decided; decisions by this
Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively do not imply that there was no right and thus
110 violation of that right at the time of trial-only that no remedy will be provided; "would be
quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether constitutional violations occurred in
trials conducted before a certain date depends on how much time was required to complete the
appellate process").

The claims in Hoffman's Third Petition were clearly known and asserted in prior
proceedings. . .Because this is a second successive post-conviction petition which
does not fall within the exceptions ofthe statute, it is specifically barred by LC.
519-2719.
Id. a1 30, 961. The Hoffman court did no1 address the argument that Ring constituted new

evidence in support of one or more old claims and that, therefore, the claims fell within the
Section 19-2719(5) exception to the forty-two day liinitations period. H o f f u n does not help the
State.
B.

This Court's Precedent Requires Applying The Linkletter Test.

The State makes two final arguments why new rules of law are not cognizable in
successive post-conviction petitions. First, it contends, its position is bolstered by the Court
never having applied the Linkletter test in a capital case and that, when confronted with
retroactivity questions in successive capital post-conviction appeals, it has dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code Section 2719(5). Respondent's Brief at 14-19. Second, in
the course of making its first argument, the State switches horses and argues that the Court has
rejected the Linlcletter test. Respondent's Brief at 15-18, Each of these two arguments fails
1.

None of the cases relied on by the State support its position that the
Court has implicitly applied Section 19-2719 to determine whether the
question of retroactivity may properly be reached.

As support for its first argument, the State contends that in Fetter@ v. State, I21 Idaho

417, 825 P.2d 1073, reh 'g denied (1992), the Court excepted successive post-convictioll cases
from the Linkletter test by "implicitly appl[ying] I.C. 519-2719 to address whether Idaho law
permits the retroactive application of new rules of law raised in successive post-conviction
petitions." Respondent's Brief at 15. It is important to note just what the State is and what it is

not saying here at this point in its argument. It is not contending that the Court has adopted some

other test to detennine whether a new rule should be retroactively applied to cases in a successive
post-conviction posture. Rather, it claims that when confronted with a successive capital postconviction petition appeal, the Court applies Section 19-2719(5) to detennine "whether Idaho
law permits the retroactive application of new rules of law raised in successive post-convictioi~
petitions." Respondent's Brief at 14. It bears ernphasizirlg that the State is relying upon LC.
519-2719(5), which does not provide an exception for the retroactive application of new iules of
law[.]" Respondent's Brief at 18.
Remarkably, the Fetterly rationale supplies no support whatsoever for the State's
position: absent froin the Court's ailalysis is any reliance on the purported lack of a new rule of
law exception to the single post-conviction petition rule of Section 19-2719(5). Far from
avoiding the retroactivity question, the Cowl squarely identified and addressed it: "The real issue
is whether Clzarboneau applies retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance ....
[Tlhe Charboneau interpretation of LC. 5 19-2515 does not apply to the present case because the
present case was final prior to the issuance of Clzarboneau." Fetterly at 418-19, 1074-75.
Plainly, the Court held that the issue was whether Mr. Fetterly would be allowed the retroactive
application of a new rule of law to support his cognizable claim, not whether Mr. Fetterly had
stated a cognizable claim. The Court's negative answer sheds no light on whether the claim was
cognizable in the first instance. If that issue was before the Court-and nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests it was-it was left for another day.
The structure of the State's argument-that this Court's oveiruling the application of the
long established Linlcletter test to determine the retroactive effect of a new rule is revealed by a

comparison between the majority opinion and Justice Bistline's dissent-makes little sense
Silence cannot be equated with rejection. See supra at 5-6 and cases cited therein. Beyond the
strnctnre of the State's argument, its substance is counter to this Court's holdings on stare
decisis. Id.

2. This Court has never rejected the Linkletter test.
The State contends that the Court has implicitly held that the Linlcletter test is no longer
Idaho law. For all the reasons set out supra at 4-1 1, the State's argument fails.

C.

To The Extent That Section 19-2719 Purports To Deny The Courts
Jurisdiction To Entertain Successive Post-Conviction Claims Relying On The
Retroactive Application Of New Decisional Rules Of Law, It Invades The
Judiciary's Province, In Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation
Of Powers Requirement.

Noting the Court's holding that the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus[,]" Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235,237,459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969), and that the
legislature "may add to the efficacy of the writ[,]" Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d
280 (1964), the State asserts that "it naturally follows that I.C. $ 1 9-2719 does not unduly restrict
the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." Respondent's
Brief at 20. Missing from the State's argument is citation to any case holding or any reason to
think that Section 19-2719'does in fact add to the efficacy of the writ. Removing from the courts
jurisdiction to hear writs does not increase the effectiveness of the writ. But it does invade the
power of the judiciary in violation of the constitutionally inandated separation of powers. See
Opening Brief at 30-33

The sole case relied on by the State and the court below for the opposite conclusion is

Kirlcland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464,4 P.3d 1115 (2000). There, the
plaintiffs argued that a statute reducing damages allowed in tort actions by operation of law
violated the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers doctrine because it "infringes on the
inherent right of the courts to reduce jury verdicts in those instances where the evidence
demonstrates the jury's verdict is excessive as a matter of law." Id. at 471, 1122.' Noting that
none of the language in the statute at issue "purports to limit the exercise of the judiciary's
co~lstitutionalpowers or jurisdiction[,]" the Court held that "the legislature . . . has the power to
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of powers doctrine." Id.,
471, 1122.
On the State's reading of Section 19-2719, and unlike the statute in Kii.klarzd, that statute
lilllits the Court's jurisdiction to entertain successive capital post-conviction claims which rely on
the retroactive application of new law. Kivkland is inapposite.

Kivklalzd is inapposite for another reason as well. It nowhere addressed the interplay
between the legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any constitutional
rights vested in plaintiffs. Petitioner, on the other hand, is constitutionally guaranteed the right to
seek a writ of habeas corpus, and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought
exclusively illrough the vehicle of a post-conviction petition. This means that the legislature's
prerogative to limit remedies in the post-conviction context is constrained by the constitutional
prohibition against suspending the writ. Idaho Const. Art. 1 55 ("The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in the case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be prescribed by law."). The fact that

before Idaho Code Section 19-2719 was enacted, district courts reached the merits of habeas
claims filed outside the time restrictions later imposed by that statute, demonstrates that the
statute suspends the writ in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho
228,229-30,392 P.2d 279-80 (1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas
petition brought ten years after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining
purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its chose^^ means violated the
separation of powers constitutional requirement.
D.

The Legislature's Intent That Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Be Applied
Retroactively Is Irrelevant To Whether The Legislature Intended Section 192719(5) To Allow Successive Post-conviction Petitions Based On The
Retroactive Application Of New Decisional Rules of Law.

The State contends that because, when enactillg Idaho Code Section 19-2719 in 1984, the
legislature expressed that the statute be retroactively applied, Section 19-2719 clearly applies to
Petitioner's case. Mr. Fields agrees that that the legislature's statement in 1984 regarding
Section 19-2719 means that that version of the statute applied retroactively. Cf: Idaho Code
Section 73-101 (no statute may he retroactively applied absent an express legislative declaratioil
to the contrary). However, for the reasons noted above and incorporated here by reference,
there is no evidence that the legislature intended Section 19-2719(5) to prohibit successive postconviction claims which rely on the retroactive application of new rules of decisional law. The
available evidence suggests exactly the opposite. Id.

E.

Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code ~ e c t i o u192719(5)0.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) provides that, "A successive post-conviction pleading
asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive
application of new rules of law." LC. $19-2719(5)(c). This provisioil was amended into the
Idaho Code in 1.995. Petitioner's conviction was final prior to the enactment of Section 192719(5j(c).

In Idaho, a new statute is not retroactive uilless the legislature expressly declares that the
law should be applied retroactively. I.C. $ 73-101 ("No part of these compiled laws is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). "In the absence of a11 express declaration of
legislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied." Guiley v. .Jerome

County, 113 Idaho 430,433,745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987); see Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho
230,234,526 P.2d 835, 839 (1974) ("No law in Idaho will be applied retroactively in the
absence of a clear legislative illtent to that effect.").
Even when an amendment is added to ail existing statute, the legislature must expressly
declare that the amendment is to be retroactively applied. It is long settled that "that an

amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the
contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d
835 (1974)[.Iu Nebeker v. Pipe? Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23
(1987)(citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430,433,
745 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1987) (finding that an amendment was not retroactive because "it was not
'expressly ...declared' in the statue that the amendment was to be retroactively applied").

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) contains no language stating that the amendment
should be applied retroactively. When the legislature adopted the amended statute, it did not
otherwise express any intention that the new law be applied retroactively. Therefore, Idaho Code
Section 73-101 precludes the retroactive application of Section 19-2719(5) (c) to this case.
The State counters that, when first creating Section 19-2719, the legislature included
language malting it retroactively applicable. Respondent's Brief at 21. From this, the State
concludes that subsection (5)(c), enacted over ten years later, is also retroactively applicable. But
subsection (5)(c)'s enacting language does not meet this Court's clear requirement that if an
amendment is to he retroactively applied, the legislature must provide "an expvess legislative
statement." Nebeker, 113 Idaho at 614, 747 P.2d at 23. On the State's view, the legislature's
silence is an implicit adoption of its earlier express language. Nebelcer nowhere suggests that

silence may sometimes talce the place of an express statement. Further, the State's position
requires reading ambiguity into an otherwise clear decision and, thus, invites muddying
otherwise clear legislative waters. However, it is axiomatic that, "[wlhere the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court n ~ u sgive
t
effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581
(1996). Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant what is
clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986)."
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999).

Finally, absent a plainly expressed intent to the contrary, it stretches credulity to ascribe to
individual legislators or a legislature an intent that some future law, the substance of which is
entirely unknown, be retroactively applied.

Retroactively applying Section 19-2719(5)(c) is prohibited by clear and settled Idaho law.
Consequently, the State's argument, made in reliance on Section 19-2719(5)(c), that Mr. Fields'
appeal be dismissed, fails.
F.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)and Section 2719, I f T h e State's Reading
O f That Statute Is Correct, Violate Petitioner's Rights T o Due Process And
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under T h e United States And Idaho
Constitutions.

The Opening Brief argues that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates his state and
federal rights to equal protection and due process. Whereas Section 19-2719(5)(c) prohibits the
retroactive applicatioii of new law in a successive capital post-conviction proceeding, no statute
or state court decision contains a similar prohibition for non-capital successive post-conviction
petitioners. Opening Brief at 33-36. In its answering brief, the State argues that Section 192719(5)(c) is immune to these challenges because Section 19-2719 has withstood process and
equal protection challenges in the past.
While the Opening Brief anticipated some of the State's arguments, it did not foresee the
State's argument that Section 19-2719, rather than one of its subsections, precluded his claims as
non-cogiiizable. He, therefore, now also argues that applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719 by
itself to preclude his claims violates his state and federal rights to equal protection and due
process. His argument is nearly identical to the one he has already made regarding Section 192719(5)(c). In particular, his due process and equal protection rights would be violated if Section
19-2719 were applied to preclude the Idaho courts from reaching the merits of his jury trial as a
fundamental right claims by either (1) extending that statute's 42-day limitations period to claims
which did not exist within that period because, beyond the 42 day window, the United States

Supre~neCourt reversed ail earlier ruling, thus breathing life into the previously dead claim, or
(2) extending that 42-day limitations period to claims which did exist but for which additioiial
supporting facts-here, the United States Supreme Court's ruling which reversed its earlier
ruling-came to light outside that 42-day window.
Critical to both sets of equal protection and due process claims-that is, to the Section 192719(5)(c) as well as the Section 19-2719 claims-is that, if the statute at issue were applied to
block a merits review of his claims, it would infringe on the fundamental right to a jury trial, to
fairness in the criminal process, and to fairness in procedures for enforcing claims concerning
govemn~entaldeprivations of life or liberty. Applying either of the statutes at issue to block a
merits review of his clailns would violate the due process guarantee by infringing on those
fundameiital rights without being narrowly tailored lo serve a coinpelling state interest. It would
violate the equal protectioil guarantee by creating a classification anlong people or applying laws
such that only some individuals would be able to exercise those fundamental rights, without
being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The statute's stated purpose, to eliminate purportedly unnecessary delay in carrying out
death sentences, is not a compelling state interest justifying the violation of Mr. Fields'
fundamental rights. Further, even if eliminating alleged unnecessary delay were a compelling
state interest, the statutes are not narrowly tailored. On the contrary, their design obviously
allows for some petitioners to die and others to live based on a fortuity -the uncertain pace of
litigation. As noted in his Opening Brief, Mr. Fields has been denied the benefit of Ring while
this Court granted Ring sentencing relief to Mr. Fetterly, whose first degree murder prosecutioii
was commenced six years before Mr. Fields' was.

Tile State answers, first, by citing State v. Beanz, 115 Idaho 208, 211-13, 766 P.2d 678,
681-83 (1988), for the proposition that "the court [sic] expressly held I.C. g19-2719 does not
violate equal protection." Respondent's Brief at 22. It then cites to State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (1991), noting that, there, "lhe court [sic] expressly concluded I.C.
919-2719 does not violate due process." Respondent's Brief at 22. Finally, the State cites to
seven of this Court's decisions affiilning Beanz andlor Rhoade~.'~
The fundamental rights based equal protection and due process attacks on Sections 192719 and 19-2719(5)(c) raise issues of first impression for this Court. The State's answer
regarding equal protection and due process fails because none of the cases on which it relies and
no other decision from this Court's addresses equal protection or due process claims where a
fundamental right is at stake. Instead, in Beam the Court only confronted whether the difference
between the limitations periods for filing a petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (five years) versus under the Section 19-2719 (forty-two days) creates a
classification which violates the equal protection guarantee by having no rational relationship to
a legitimate govemnental purpose. Beam, 115 Idaho at 21 1-214, 766 P.2d at 681-684. The
Court held that it did not
We hold that the legislature's determination that it was necessary to reduce the
interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition of the
42-day time limit set for I.C. 9 19-2719. The legislature has identified the
problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is rationally

"Those cases are Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156 P.3d 552 (2007), remanded on
other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008); Lanlford v. State, 127
Idaho 100, 102,897 P.2d 991,993 (1995); State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638,647, 851 P.2d 934
(1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,430-31,825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rlzoades, 121 Idaho
63,72,822 P.2d 960,969, second reh g denied (1992); Paz v. State, 118 Idaho 542,559,798
P.2d 1, 18 (1990); and State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 23 1,235-36,766 P.2d 701 (1988).

related to the legitimate legislative purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed
sentences. Accordingly, LC. 5 19-2719 does not violate the defcndant's
constitutional right to equal protection, and the trial couit correctly denied Beam's
post conviction petition.
Beam at 213, 683. The shorter time allottedcapital defendants to file upheld by Beam was not a
fundame~ltalright. In none of the other cases cited by the State nor in any other case has this
Court confronted whether the classification violates the equal protection guarantee where a
fundamental right is at stake.
Similarly, in Rhoades the Court cotlfronted whether the 42-day limitations period for

filing a post-conviction petition in capital cases violates the due process guarantee. The Court
held that it did not.
Therefore we hold that LC. 5 19-2719 provides a defendant one opportunity to
raise all challenges to the coliviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction
relief except in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues
raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within the time
frame allowed by the statute. The legislature has seen fit to appropriately limit
the time frame within which to bring challenges which are known or which
reasonably should be known. The process enconlpassed in LC. 5 19-2719
providing for review by the trial couit and then this Court, provides adequate
opportunity to present the issues raised and to have them adequately reviewed.
Therefore, I.C. 5 19-2719 is not unconstitutional under due process analysis.
Rhoades 120 Idaho at 808, 820 P.2d at 678. In none of the other cases cited by the State nor in

any other case has this Court addressed whether the limitations period violates the due process
guarantee when a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial is at stake
Where fundamental rights are at stake, "strict scrutiny" is the proper standard of review.
Put differently, the due process inquiry is whether the restriction on the exercise of the
fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The equal protection
inquiry is whether the classification or application of laws such that only some individuals may

exercise the fundamei~talright at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The State has identified no compelling state interest in its answering brief. Nor has it proffered
any explanation for how the 42-day limitation period collstitutes narrow tailoring in furtherance
of any legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. Even supposing, for the sake of
argument, that some compelling state interest could be served by the 42-day limitations period,
applying that limitation to prohibit the retroactive applicatio~lof fuildainental rights will-and
indeed, has-resulted in extraordinarily u ~ ~ e q udispositions.
al
As noted above, this Court granted
Ring sentencing relief to Mr. Fetterly, whose prosecution coinmeliced four years before the

prosecution against Mr. Fields was started.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons and for all the reasons in the Opetling Brief, the Court should remand
this case for resentencing consistent with the principles announced in Ring v. Arizona..
Alternatively, the Court should substitute a life sentence for the death sentence now imposed 011
Petitioner.
Respectfully submitted,
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